We consider the problem of making graph databases such as social networks available to researchers for knowledge discovery while providing privacy to the participating entities. We use a parametric graph model, the stochastic Kronecker graph model, to model the observed graph and construct an estimator of the "true parameter" in a way that both satisfies the rigorous requirements of differential privacy and demonstrates experimental utility on several important graph statistics. The estimator, which may then be published, defines a probability distribution on graphs. Sampling such a distribution yields a synthetic graph that mimics important properties of the original sensitive graph and consequently, could be useful for knowledge discovery.
INTRODUCTION
As graph databases such as social networks become ubiquitous, researchers have an unprecedented opportunity to understand and analyze complex social phenomena. For example, access to a social network may help researchers track the spread of an epidemic or a sexually-transmitted disease in a community. While society would like to encourage such scientific endeavors, if individuals run the risk of being identified, they may be apprehensive of participating in, or making their social network data available for, such studies. To ensure that public policy promotes such scientific projects, we are faced with the problem of providing researchers with Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. a fairly accurate picture of the quantities or trends they are looking for without disclosing sensitive information about participating individuals.
The problem of releasing aggregate information about a statistical database while simultaneously providing privacy to the individual participants of the database has been extensively studied in the computer science and statistical communities. There have been attempts to formalize notions of privacy in such settings and to capture the requirements of privacy in a formal model, with an ultimate goal of facilitating rigorous analyses of solutions that may be proposed as "privacy preserving". Differential privacy (DP) has been one of the main lines of research that has emerged out of these attempts over the last seven years. See Dwork [4] for a survey. Differential privacy formalizes the idea that privacy is provided if the privacy risk an individual faces does not change significantly if he or she participates in a statistical database.
There are numerous examples of data that have associations between entities, such as social networks, routing networks, citation graphs, biological networks, etc. Such associations between entities may be modeled as a graph, where individuals are represented by the nodes, and relationships between individuals as edges. Each node may be associated with various attributes. The risk of being identified by participating in such a database is two-fold: individuals may be identified by virtue of their attributes or they may be identified from their associations with other individuals and some background information, that they usually cannot predict or control, or they might be identified using a combination of the two. In this paper, we will only be concerned about preventing identification of the nodes using associations between individuals and some possible background information, an approach that Korolova et al. [12] call link privacy. Using the work of Hay et al. [9] , this can be extended to include a weak form of node privacy. Our proposed mechanism for synthetic graph generation, which aims to approximate certain statistics of the original graph, satisfies the rigorous definition of ε-differential privacy. Private estimation of the Stochastic Kronecker Graph (SKG) model parameter is an interesting problem, especially given the surge in the popularity of SKGs for graph modeling. Our initial attempt at private SKG estimation [17] was based on the Kronecker graph estimator of Leskovec and Faloutsos [15] . However, our solution was inefficient because we did not have any practical way of bounding the global sensitivity of the required parameters. Subsequent work by Gleich and Owen [8] , which estimates the graph model parameters by using a "moment matching" method, makes it possible for us to apply the work of Hay et al. [9] and Nissim et al. [18] to efficiently compute private approximations of the "matching statistics" and, hence, to obtain private estimates of the model parameter.
To generate representative synthetic graphs, we use tools from statistical inference. Assuming that observed data is generated from an underlying, but unknown, probability distribution, we use the data to infer the distribution. A graph G(V, E) is represented as a vector of random variables {E1, E2, . . . , EN }, where each of the Ei's are 0-1 random variables representing the presence or absence of an edge (assuming a specific known ordering of all potential edges between |V | vertices). We assume that data is generated from a parameterized family of probability distributions. Given a graph, that is treated as a sequence of observations in such a model, our goal is to infer the parameter of the distribution and hence the distribution itself. If the estimator preserves differential privacy and is a good estimator, we can publish it and anyone interested in studying statistical properties of the original graph G can sample the distribution to yield a synthetic graph GS which mimics the statistical properties of G. We could also sample several graphs from the distribution and compute an average of the desired statistic over several such graphs. To use such an approach, we need to impose a relevant model on the kinds of graphs we are interested in. The choice of a model is typically guided by empirical and theoretical considerations of how well the model captures key properties of real-world graphs. For our purpose, we use Leskovec et al.'s Kronecker graph model [15, 14] that effectively models salient features of real-world graphs. We compute an estimator, based on Gleich and Owen's non-private estimator [8] , that is provably differentially private and that still favorably compares with the estimators proposed by Leskovec et al. [14] and Gleich and Owen [8] in terms of matching several statistics of the original graph. Section 2 summarizes related work in privacy and anonymization. In Section 3, we provide the required background about the stochastic Kronecker graph (SKG) model and parameter estimation in this model. In Section 4, we discuss our main results: we show how we can compute an estimator of a given graph in the SKG model in a differentially private manner and also experimentally demonstrate how well the private estimator does on mimicking statistical properties of the original graph when compared to non-private methods such as those of Gleich and Owen [8] and Leskovec et al. [14] . We observe that our private estimator performs almost similalrly to Gleich and Owen's non-private estimators, for meaningful values of the privacy parameter ε.
RELATED WORK IN PRIVACY AND ANONYMIZATION
The problem of anonymizing databases has been receiving considerable attention over the last decade. However researchers have only recently started looking at the problem of privacy preservation in graphs. Backstrom, Dwork, and Kleinberg [1] describe a family of attacks where access to a naively anonymized graph with the identifiers of the nodes stripped can enable an adversary to learn whether edges exist or not between specified pairs of nodes. Many solutions assuming various models of attacks have been proposed: see [12, 2, 10, 23, 22] for examples. Most of that work, provides guarantees only against a specific set of adversaries who are assumed to have specific background knowledge. In reality, however, individuals and even organizations managing the database have little or no control over auxiliary information available to the adversary. ε-Differential privacy provides a guarantee that even if a participating individual removed his or her data from the database, the potential outputs of a querying mechanism (whether interactive or non-interactive) and consequences of those outputs would not become significantly more or less probable. These relative probabilities are parametrized by ε, a public parameter. We review the formal definitions introduced by Dwork et al. [6] in Section 4. While ε-differential privacy is not an absolute guarantee, it is very strong (what Dwork [4] calls an ad omnia guarantee), where no assumptions about the auxiliary information or computational power available to the attacker have been made.
Following the introduction of the DP framework in [3] , a growing line of work has emerged identifying differentially private mechanisms for both interactive and non-interactive settings. For example, see [16, 18, 6, 4] .
We attempted to use the method of using stochastic graph models to generate private "synthetic" graphs [17] but were unable to provide a useful upper bound on the global sensitivity of the Maximum Likelihood Estimator or an approximation of the MLE of the Stochastic Kronecker graph model used by Leskovec et al. [15] . Consequently, we were unable to use those ideas to actually model a real-world graph and release the estimator in a differentially private manner. However subsqequent work by Gleich et al. [8] estimates model parameters using a moment matching method rather than an approximation of the MLE. The algorithm matches four statistics of the observed graph to the expected values of these statistics over the probability distribution on graphs defined by the parameters. This enables us to use the work of Hay et al. [9] and the results of Nissim et al. [18] to compute differentially private approximations to these features F of the observed graph that we seek to match. Hay et al. [9] compute a differentially private approximation to the degree distribution of a graph using post-processing techniques. Nissim et al. [18] compute a differentially private approximation to the number of triangles of a graph.
Recently, Karwa et al. [11] apply the notion of smooth sensitivity formulated by Nissim et al. [18] to compute differentially private approximations to other graph statistics such as the number of k-triangles and k-stars. Sala et al. [20] also generate synthetic graphs that are similar to the original graph by extracting the original graph's detailed structure into degree correlation statistics, and then computing differentially private approximations of these statistics to generate a private synthetic graph. This is closest in spirit to our work. We have not yet compared the qualitiy of their private synthetic graphs to ours.
PARAMETRIC MODELS AND ESTIMA-TION
This section provides background on parametric model estimation, the Stochastic Kronecker Graph Model [15, 14] and the moment based estimation method of Gleich [8] in which our work is grounded.
A parametric statistical model, say F, is a set of probability distributions that can be parametrized by a finite set of parameters. Parametric estimation in such a model assumes that data observed is generated from a parametrized family of probability distributions F = {f (x; θ) : θ ∈ Θ)}, where θ is an unknown parameter (or vector of parameters) that can take values in the parameter space Θ. Let X = (X1, X2, . . . XN ) denote N random variables representing observations X1 = x1, X2 = x2, . . . , XN = xN , and let the joint probability density function of (X1, . . . , XN ), given by f (x1, x2, . . . , xN ; θ), depend on θ, the parameter of the distribution.
After observing this data, an estimateθ of the unknown true parameter θ is formed.θ is a function of the observations and hence, it is also a random variable. The problem of parameter estimation is to pick aθ from the parameter space that best estimates the true parameter in some optimum sense. Parameter estimation is a well studied branch of statistics; see [21] for a review.
As mentioned before, the choice of a generative parametric model for graphs is typically based on empirical or theoretical considerations of how well a model captures significant descriptive properties of graphs, such as degree distribution, specific patterns observed, etc. Once such a model is defined, the task consists of estimating the parameter of the model that generated a particular instance G. G can be looked at as a sequence of observations E1, . . . , EN where the Ei's are 0-1 random variables representing the absence or presence of an edge i (according to a specific ordering). The estimated parameter defines a probability distribution on all graphs, one from which we assumed G was generated. One can then sample this probability distribution to generate a synthetic graph GS and run queries on it to get an approximation to the answers that would have obtained from the original graph G. In this section, we introduce the Stochastic Kronecker Graph (SKG) model, the specific generative model we use. In Section 4, we show how to estimate the parameter in a differentially private manner that demonstrates experimental utility with respect to certain statistics.
Kronecker graph model
Modeling graphs in general, and networks in particular, is an important problem. Most work in graph modeling consists of studying patterns and properties found in real-world graphs and then finding models that help understand the emergence of these properties. Some of the key properties studied are degree distribution, diameter, hop-plot, scree plot, and node triangle participation [15, 14] . The Kronecker graph model effectively captures some of the salient patterns of real-world graphs, such as heavy tailed in-degree and out-degree distributions, heavy tails for eigenvalues and eigenvectors, small diameters, and "densification power law" observed in the Internet, the Web, citation graphs, and online social networks. Many models in the literature focus on modeling one static property of the network model while neglecting others. Moreover, the properties of many such network models have not been formally analyzed. Leskovec et al.'s Kronecker graph model has been empirically shown to match multiple properties of real networks. It also facilitates formal analysis of these properties and establishes, empirically and analytically, that Kronecker graphs mimic some important properties of real-world graphs such as those described above. The Kronecker graph results of Leskovec et al. [14, 15] have three important contributions:
1. Their graph generation model provably produces networks with many properties often found in real-world graphs, such as a power-law degree distribution and small diameter.
2. Their approximate MLE algorithm is fast and scalable, being able to handle very large networks with millions of nodes.
3. The estimated parameter generates realistic looking graphs that empirically match the statistical properties of the target real graphs.
Kronecker graphs are based on a recursive construction, with an aim of creating self-similar graphs recursively. The process starts with an initiator graph G1 with N1 nodes. By a recursive procedure, larger graphs G2, . . . , Gn are generated in succession such that the kth graph,
nodes. This procedure is formalized by introducing the concept of Kronecker product of the adjacency matrices of two graphs [15] .
Definition 3.1 ( [15]). Given two matrices A and B of sizes
The Kronecker product of two graphs is the Kronecker product of their adjacency matrices, defined as:
. Let G and H be graphs with adjacency matrices A(G) and A(H) respectively. The Kronecker product G ⊗ H of the two graphs is the graph whose adjacency matrix is the Kronecker product A(G) ⊗ A(H).
Informally, the Kronecker product of two graphs G and H is the "expanded" graph obtained by replacing each node in G by a copy of H. G2 is obtained by taking the Kronecker product of G1 with itself, G3 by taking the Kronecker product of G2 with G1, and so on, such that the kth Kronecker power of G1 gives G k . Formally: Definition 3.3 (Kronecker power [15] ). Given a Kronecker initiator adjacency matrix Θ1, the kth power of Θ1 defined by
1 is a Kronecker graph of order k with respect to Θ1.
Stochastic Kronecker graph model
In this section we review the SKG model and in Sections 3.3 and 3.4, we review parameter estimation in this model. Leskovec et al. [15] introduce stochasticity in the Kronecker graphs model by letting each entry of the N1 × N1 initiator matrix Θ1 take values in the range [0, 1] instead of binary values, representing the probability of that edge being present. If the Kronecker power of Θ1 is computed in the manner explained above, larger and larger stochastic adjacency matrices are obtained where each entry represents the probability of that particular edge appearing in the graph. Θ
[k] 1 , therefore, defines a probability distribution on all graphs with N k 1 nodes. To obtain a stochastic Kronecker graph (SKG), an edge is independently chosen with a probability specified by the corresponding entry in the matrix.
Definition 3.4 (SKG).
If Θ is an N1 × N1 probability matrix such that θij ∈ Θ denotes the probability that edge
, is a stochastic matrix where each entry Puv ∈ P encodes the probability of edge (u, v) appearing. This stochastic matrix encodes a stochastic Kronecker graph. To obtain a graph G * , an instance or realization of the distribution, denoted as R(P ), an edge (u, v) is included in G * = R(P ) with probability Puv.
Given a stochastic matrix P , and a graph G * realized from P in the manner specified above, each edge (i, j) in G * is picked independently by tossing a coin with a bias specified by Pij .
Notice that, G * as defined is a directed graph, but in this paper, like Gleich et al. [8] we examine modeling of undirected graphs only. If A * is the adjacency matrix of G * , then it may contain loops and may not necessarily be symmetric. These loops and the assymetry are removed by defining the random graph G with an adjacency matrix A such that, Aij = 0, ∀i = j and symmetrizing A * by letting Aij = A * i,j if i > j and having Aji = A * ji if i < j.
Parameter Estimation in the SKG Model
For every graph G, P (G) is the probability that a given stochastic graph model, with a given set of parameters, generates graph G. In the stochastic Kronecker graph model, probability distributions over graphs are parametrized by the initiator matrix, Θ of size N1 × N1. An appropriate size for N1 is decided upon using standard techniques of model selection. Analysis in [15] shows that for many real-world graphs, having N1 > 2 does not accrue a significant advantage as far as matching of some statistics is concerned. In this paper, we set N1 = 2, to compare our results to those obtained by Gleich et al. [8] .
Given a graph G that is assumed to be generated by an SKG model, we want to estimate the true parameter-the initiator matrix Θ-that generated G by an appropriatê Θ. Leskovec et al. provide an algorithm that is linear in the number of edges to estimate the parameterΘ. Let G have N nodes and assume N = N k 1 , where the size of the initiator matrix is N1 × N1. Using Θ
[k] = P , P defines a SKG on N nodes: Puv is the probability that there is an edge between nodes u and v. Hence, the probability p(G|Θ) = p(G = R(P )) that G is a realization of P can be computed easily. The Maximum Likelihood EstimatorΘ maximizes the likelihood of realizing G. Formally, the MLE solves:Θ = argmax Θ p(G|Θ)
Moment based estimation of SKG's
Gleich and Owen [8] propose an alternative method to estimate SKG model parameters. They do so for reasons of computational cost of estimating the MLE of the SKG model. Leskovec et al. [14] try to approximate the MLE. Gleich and Owen use the so-called moment-based estimation of the model parameter, where the observed values of certain statistics of the graphs are equated with those of the expected value of these statistics over graphs that a paramter would define. They remark that "while moment methods can be statistically inefficient compared to maximum likelihood, statistical efficiency is of reduced importance for enormous samples and in settings where the dominant error is lack of fit." with a, b, c, ∈ [0, 1] and a ≥ c. The Kronecker structure of P makes it possible to compute closed formulae for these statistics from Θ. Given Θ of the form above, the expected count for these statistics can be calculated explicitly. Specifically, given P = [Θ] k , closed formulae can be derived for H, ∆ and T in terms of a, b, c, as follows:
The problem then is to find an initiator matrix whose expected counts match the counts of the features F (G) of the observed graph as closely as possible.
Given G, one way to chooseΘ (or equivalently,â,b, andĉ) is to solve
where the sum is over three of four of the features F ∈ {E, ∆, H, T } and the minimization is taken over 0 ≤ c ≤ a ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ b ≤ 1. A more general minimization method solves:
where Dist is either of the two distance functions:
DistSq(x, y) = (x − y) 2 or Dist abs (x, y) = |x − y| and Norm is one of the normalizations:
Gleich and Owen [8] find that robust results arise from the combination of DistSq and Norm F 2 . The next section uses these results.
A DIFFERENTIALLY PRIVATE GRAPH ESTIMATOR
We present our main result in this section. We use the results of Gleich and Owen [8] to provide a differentially private estimator of a given graph. Based on experimental results, in Section 4.2 we argue that a modification that makes the estimator differentially private does not destroy the desirable properties of the graph model estimator for both some real-world and synthetic networks.
Differential Privacy
After a private estimator is computed, we may publish it and sample graphs from this distribution to compute an approximation of relevant statistics. Under the assumption that the model captures the essential properties of the graph, our estimator will define a probability distribution from which we can sample graphs that are "similar" to the original graph G. We emphasize here that we rely upon the results of [14] to justify using the SKG model to maintain "similarity" of synthetic graphs to the original graphs. Our private estimator suffers from the same limitation that the SKG does in capturing properties of a real-world network but also demonstrates almost the same accuracy. In this section, we present our main result showing how to compute an estimator for the SKG model that is also differentially private. We first formalize the idea that the output of the estimator should not change significantly if a link between two individuals is included or excluded from the observations. Definition 4.1 (Edge neighborhood [9, 17] ). Given a graph G(V, E), the (edge) neighborhood of a graph is the set
Applying the standard definition of differential privacy to graphs instead of databases and using the above definition of neighborhood yields the following:
Definition 4.2 (Edge differential privacy [18]).
A parameter estimation algorithm that takes as input a graph G, and outputsΘ(G), preserves (ε, δ)-differential edge privacy if for all closed subsets S of the output parameter space, and all pairs of neighboring graphs G and G ′ , and for all δ ∈ [0, 1],
The original notion of ε-differential privacy [6] is a special case of the (ε, δ)-differential privacy in which δ = 0.
Hay et al. [9] also define node differential privacy, by analogously defining the notion of node neighborhood of a graph. Two graphs are node neighbors if they differ by at most one node and all the incident edges. This notion of privacy is highly restrictive when trying to compute accurate approximations of graph statistics because of potentially high degree nodes and the loss of information that would accompany their deletion. To provide some degree of privacy to nodes, Hay et al. [9] introduce the notion of k-edge differential privacy. In k-edge differential privacy, graphs G and
They also make the observation that any algorithm that provides ε-edge privacy with respect to (1-)edge neighbors, will provide kε-edge privacy with respect to k-edge neighbors using a well-known composition theorem (stated here as Theorem 4.9). In this paper, we only examine 1-edge differential privacy.
According to Definition 4.2, for a graph estimator that preserves differential privacy, outputs of the estimating algorithm do not become significantly more or less likely if an edge is included or excluded from the database. If the inclusion or exclusion of a single link between individuals cannot change the output distribution appreciably, even an adversary who may have additional background information will not, by interacting with the algorithm, learn significantly more about an individual than could be learned about this individual otherwise.
Dwork et al. [6] and Nissim et al. [18] define the notions of local sensitivity and global sensitivity:
As an example, when computing the local sensitivity of the number of triangles in a graph G having N nodes, the domain D is the space of all graphs on N nodes.
Definition 4.4 (Global Sensitivity [6] ). The global sensitivity of a function of a graph G, f :
Using these notions we compute a differentially private estimator based on matching the expected count to the observed counts of the statistics-we supply differentially private approximations of the statistics E, H, ∆ and T to Equation 2. We do this by computing differentially private approximation to the degree sequence vector of G and the number of triangles in G.
Let d be the vector of degrees of G, such that di is the degree of node i of graph G. Let d be sorted to yield dS such that dS(i) is the i-th smallest degree. Hay et al. [9] propose a method of computing a differentially private approximationd of the sorted degree vector dS by adding a vector of appropriate Laplacian noise to dS and then using postprocessing techniques that they experimetally show to be a highly accurate approximation of dS. Let Lap(σ) N denote a N length vector of independent random samples from a Laplace distribution with mean zero and scale σ. We know that the global sensitivity of dS, GS d is equal to 2. The Laplacian noise adding method os as follows:
Theorem 4.5 ([6] ). LetQ denote the randomized algorithm that takes as input graph G, a query Q of length ℓ, and some ε > 0, and outputŝ
Then, AlgorithmQ satisfies (ε, 0)-differential privacy.
Hay et al. [9] use Theorem 4.5 to compute a "noisy" degree sequenced as an approximation of dS:
Therefore,d is then an (ε, 0)-differentially private approximation of dS. Hay et al. [9] use post-processing techniques that seek to "remove some of the extra noise" ind, to compute ad that is experimentally and theoretically shown to provide higher accuracy. Usingd, we compute (ε, 0)-differentially private approximations of E, H, and T in the following manner:
. Hence, we have:
This is straightforward, as computingd is (ε, 0)-differentially private. Since the number ∆ of triangles is not a simple function of the degree distribution, we instead use the tehcniques of Nissim et al. [18] to compute an (ε, δ)-differentially private approximation of ∆. To reduce the amount of noise that needs to be added to compute an approximation to ∆, Nissim et al. [18] use an upper bound on the local sensitivity of ∆(G) by computing the β-smooth sensitivity of ∆(G).
Let dist(G, G ′ ) be the symmetric difference between the edge sets of graphs G and G ′ . Hence, if G and G ′ are neighbors by Definition 4.1, dist(G, G ′ ) = 1.
Definition 4.7 (β-smooth sensitivity [18] ). For β > 0, the β-smooth sensitivity of f at G, is
The smooth sensitivity can be used to compute a differentially private approximation to a function f : Theorem 4.8 ( [18] ). Let f : D n → R be any realvalued query function from an input x ∈ D n for some domain D,and let SS β,f : D n → R be the β-smooth sensitivity of f for some β > 0. Then, if β < ε 2 ln(2/δ) and δ ∈ (0, 1),
Algorithm 1 illustrates the process we adopt. Our results use the above theorem and a composition theorem: Theorem 4.9 (Composition theorem [5] ). Let M1, M2, . . . , M ℓ , be ℓ number of (ε, δ)-differentially private mechanisms computed using graph G. Then any mechanism M that is a composition of M1, M2, . . . , M ℓ , is (ℓε, ℓδ)-differentially private.
Using these results we compute an (ε, δ)-differentially private approximation of ∆ by outputting:
as an (ε, δ)-differentially private approximation to the number of triangles in G. Using Theorems 4.9, 4.8, and Fact 4.6, we have Theorem 4.10. The computation ofF = {Ẽ,H,T ,∆} is (2ε, δ) differentially private.
Using these private statisticsF , in the moment-matching algorithm of Gleich and Owen (Equation 2), we obtains a differentially private estimator. Algorithm 1 illustrates the process. Hence, we have:
Experimental results
In this section, we discuss application of Algorithm 1 to three real-world networks and two synthetic Kronecker graphs. CA-GrQC and CA-HepTh are co-authorship networks from arXiv [14] . The nodes of the network represent authors, and there is an edge between two nodes when the authors jointly wrote a paper. AS20 is a real-world technological infrastructure network [14] . Each node represents a router on the internet and edges represent a physical or virtual connection between the routers. All these graphs are naturally undirected and all edges are unweighted. We downloaded these networks from Snap [13] and used the provided Algorithm 1 Differentially-private estimation ofΘ Input: Graph G, privacy parameters (ε, δ) Table 1 : Comparison of parameter estimation for ε = 0.2, δ = 0.01 library for our experiments. We also used the code provided by Gleich [7] to compute both the private and non-private moment-based estimators of the networks. Table 1 compares the results of Algorithm 1 (column titled "Private") to those of Gleich et al. [8] ("KroMom") and Leskovec et al. [14] ("KronFit"). Our results are based on Gleich et al.'s results, so it is not surprising that our results are close to theirs-we observe that the private parameters we compute are very similar. To provide a reasonable comparison, for each of the graphs, we use the same Dist and Norm functions in the parameter estimation of Equation 2 as Gleich and Owen. and k = 14 to obtain a synthetic graph on 2 14 nodes. Then we try to recover the parameters of this synthetic graph by running all three algorithms on it. From Table 1 , we see that all three algorithms do a satisfactory job in recovering the parameter when the modeling assumption is true, that is when the graph indeed is a stochastic Kronecker graph.
To further understand how well the private estimator captures various properties of the graph, we carry out further experiments. All experiments are conducted for (0.2, 0.1)-differential privacy. Using the parameter estimates of a graph, we generate 100 synthetic graphs from the estimated parameters for all three methods, and compute various expected statistics over these 100 graphs. These statistics have been computed in [14] for these graphs, so we compare the performance of our private estimator on these statistics to Leskovec et al.'s results. We summarize these statistics briefly:
1. The degree distribution plots the distribution of the degrees of the nodes.
2. The Hop-plot plots the number of reachable pairs of noded within h hops, as a function of the number of hops h.
3. The Scree plot plots the eigenvalues (or singular values) of the graph adjacency matrix, versus their rank, using the logarithmic scale.
4.
The Network values plots the distribution of eigenvector components (indicators of "network value") associated with the largest eigenvalue of the graph adjacency matrix.
5. The average clustering coefficient plotted as a function of the node degree. The clustering coefficient is a measure of the extent to which nodes in a graph tend to cluster together.
For each of these graphs we plot these statistics. "Original" refers to the original graph, "KronFit" refers to a single synthetic Kronecker graph generated from the parameterΘ which is computed using the KronFit algorithm of Leskovec et al. [15] . "KronMom" refers to a single synthetic Kronecker graph generated from the parameterΘ that is computed using the "KronMom", moment-matching algorithm of Gleich and Owen [8] . "Private" refers to a single Kronecker graph generated fromΘ computed in Algorithm 1. The prefix "Expected" refers to the expected value of the statistics being computed over 100 synthetic realizations of the appropriate Kronecker graphs.
From Fig 1, we notice that the observed statistics for a single realization are very close to the expected values, hence one realization appears to give us a representative sample, at least for these four graphs.
To reduce clutter, for CA-HepTh (Figure 3 ), AS20 (Figure 2) , and the synthetic Kronecker graph (Figure 4 ), we only show single realizations. We observe that in all four cases, the statistics are well-approximated and very close to the "predictions" made by both the "KronFit" and the "KronMom" estimators. In the case of the synthetic Kronecker graph we also observe a good matching of the average clustering coefficient which is usually not the case for real-world networks. This has to do with modeling assumptions. We see that the SKG models the clustering coefficient well for AS20 but not for CA-GrQC and CA-HepTh. The private estimators are also observed to perform comparably. 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIREC-TIONS
We applied the rigorous differential privacy framework to problems of generating synthetic graphs that can be made publicly available for research purposes while providing privacy to the individual participants. We built upon the work of Leskovec et al. [14, 15] and Gleich and Owen [8] in the generative Kronecker graph model to demonstrate that synthetic graphs that are statistically similar to the original sensitive graphs can be generated in a manner that is differentially private. While we used a specific model and a specific estimator, our work can be broadly placed in the framework of private parametric estimation for graph models.
There are several future directions for future work. A comparison of our results to those of Sala et al. [20] seems most relevant. We plan on undertaking a study that compares the estimated statistics of the synthetic graphs derived by our method to those computed by Sala et al. An empirical study of the smooth sensitivity of the number of triangles in the SKG is another direction we are currently pursuing. Nissim et al. [18] propose an upper bound on the smooth sensitivity of the number of triangles in the G(n, p) Erdos-Renyi model. It would be interesting to examine the smooth sensitivity of ∆ as a function of the size of the graph G. Preliminary experiments indicate that in the SKG model, SS∆ might grow slowly. Yet another direction that presents itself is examine private estimation in other graph models such as the Exponential Random Graph Model (ERGM) [19] , especially since the results of Karwa et al. [11] provide accurate differentially private approximations to statistics used in ERGM estimation.
